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ABSTRACT
Despite the key role of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), extant literature pays little attention to the physical characteristics 
of the CEO. Therefore, this paper investigates certain physical characteristics - such as age, gender, ethnicity and 
nationality of the CEO in relation to accounting (ROE) and market-based (market value) firm performance. The paper 
applies OLS with robust standard errors to a panel composed of 1600 firm-year observations of non-financial Malaysian 
listed companies between 2010 and 2014. The results reveal that the ethnicity (Chinese) and nationality (foreign) of 
a CEO have a significant positive association with both proxies of firm performance, while the age of the CEO has no 
significant effect. Moreover, a female CEO has an insignificant and significant positive relation with ROE and firm market 
value, respectively. Alongside contributing to the limited literature that exists in relation to the subject, the paper provides 
important insights for regulators, shareholders, investors, banks, corporate boards and financial institutions in regards 
to the evaluation of firms and the allocation of economic resources. 
Keywords: CEO Physical Characteristics; Firm Accounting and Market-based Performance; Non-financial Malaysian 
Listed Companies
INTRODUCTION
Individuals that run firms decide their ultimate fate (i.e., 
success or failure). The most powerful and influential 
among these individuals is known as Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO). Being the captain of the ship, the CEO is 
commended for the improved performance of the firm 
and blamed if performance diminishes (Butt, Horton, 
& Millo 2012; Peni 2012). A CEO plays a vital strategic 
role in a firm, (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Lin 2014) 
particularly in deciding whether a firm stays in a current 
target market or switches to other target market(s) (Joyce, 
Nohria & Roberson 2004). In addition to monitoring daily 
operations and overall direction, a CEO also formulates and 
implements various strategies of the firm (Daily, Certo 
& Dalton 2000; Lin 2014; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2009).
Therefore, the ‘swimming’ or ‘sinking’ of firms greatly 
depends on CEOs (Westerberg, Singh & Hackner 1997). 
Thus, it is logical and rationale to focus upon CEOs as a 
topic of research (Butt et al. 2012; Peni 2012). 
 Accordingly, many empirical studies investigate 
certain characteristics of CEOs (Adams, Gupta, Haughton & 
Leeth 2007; Bhagat, Bolton & Subramanian 2010; Jalbert, 
Chan, Jalbert & Landry 2007; Zhang & Rajagopalan 
2009). However, most studies are conducted in developed 
countries; and focus on a single characteristic of the CEO, 
such as origin (Zhang & Rajagopalan 2009); age (Ewart 
2014; Serfling 2013); gender (Adams et al. 2007; Ewart 
2014; Serfling 2013); education (Bhagat et al. 2010); 
experience (Cline & Yore 2016); salary (Ewart 2014); 
ethnicity (Mycroft 2012); and nationality (Jalbert et al. 
2007). With the exception of Butt et al. (2012); Ewart 
(2014); and Cline & Yore (2016), such studies investigate 
the impact of CEO characteristics on firms’ accounting 
performance as an outcome variable. 
 Aside from Amran, Yusof, Ishak and Aripin 
(2014), who focus on accounting-based performance 
of government-linked companies, and Wah (2015) who 
investigates CEO nationality in Malaysia, there is a paucity 
of research concerning the physical characteristics of 
CEOs in the context of developing countries. Therefore, 
the present paper simultaneously investigates certain 
physical characteristics of a CEO, such as age, gender, 
ethnicity and nationality, in relation to both the accounting 
(ROE) and market-based performance (market value) of 
non-financial listed companies of Malaysia, a developing 
country, between 2010 and 2014. The simultaneous use 
of certain physical characteristics of a CEO, two proxies 
of firm performance and in the context of a developing 
country in a single study enriches extant literature, which 
either focuses on accounting (Bhagat et al. 2010; Zhang 
& Rajagopalan 2009) or market-based performance in 
developed countries (Butt et al. 2012; Cline & Yore 2016; 
Ewart 2014).
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. 
The next sections synthesise extant literature and research 
design. The aforementioned sections are followed by a 
description and discussion of the findings of the study. The 
final section outlines recommendations, the limitations of 
the present study and directions for future research in the 
area. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The CEO is an integral part of the Top Management Team 
(TMT). The upper echelons theory posits that the personal 
characteristics of the TMT determine their actions, which 
have a direct association with firms’ strategic management 
and performance (Bertrand & Schoar 2003; Carpenter, 
Sanders & Gregersen 2000; Hambrick & Mason 1984; 
Michel & Hambrick 1992; Zhang & Rajagopalan 
2009). The measurement procedure categorises these 
characteristics into quantifiable and non-quantifiable. 
The former, which is also known as physical, visible or 
factual characteristics, include age, gender, experience, 
education, race/ethnicity and nationality. As the name 
implies, these characteristics are comparatively easy to 
measure and, hence, preferred to be used in research. 
The latter accounts for leadership style, interpersonal 
communication, and team-building skills, which are 
imprecise, subjective, complex and difficult to measure 
(Bhagat et al. 2010). Accordingly, this paper selects certain 
quantifiable or physical characteristics of a CEO in relation 
to firm performance. 
CEO AGE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Despite eligibility for reappointment, the Companies Act, 
1965 mandates the retirement of CEOs of the Malaysian 
listed companies after every three years (Amran et al. 2014). 
The upper echelon theory also supports the appointment 
of young CEOs due to the quick adaptability of young 
CEOs, which is beneficial for firms when faced with non-
routine and quick decisions (Hambrick & Mason 1984). 
Many studies find that senior CEOs prefer investments that 
could yield benefits before their retirement. Therefore, 
senior CEOs focus on the short-term, rather than long-term, 
objectives of the firm. Also, senior CEOs are found to be 
unskilled in regards to estimations; corrective measures; 
decisive actions; and critical decisions (Cline & Yore 2016; 
Jalbert, Rao & Jalbert 2002). Accordingly, the death of a 
senior CEO results in high-value gains (Jenter, Matveyev 
& Roth 2015). Many empirical studies also find that senior 
CEOs have a significant negative association with firm 
market value (Cline & Yore 2016; Jalbert et al. 2002) and 
the ROA of government-linked companies (Amran et al. 
2014). Unlike senior CEOs, young CEOs are adept in regards 
to creativity and acquainted with emerging technologies 
and trends. Such attributes facilitate firms in making wise, 
effective and disciplined decisions (Ante & Lublin 2012; 
Jenter et al. 2015). Accordingly, Jenter et al. (2015) find 
that the sudden death of a young CEO results in huge losses 
to the firms.
 In contrast, it is argued that age of the CEO represents 
his/her experience in business operations, market and 
strategic management (Ewart 2014). Also, it is argued that 
a senior CEO will reduce a firm’s risk by investing in less 
vulnerable projects (Serfling 2013). Moreover, senior CEOs 
have a competitive edge over their younger counterparts 
who primarily focus on short-term goals for improving 
their reputation (Hirshleifer 1993; Peni 2012). Despite 
weak physical stamina, senior CEOs are still considered 
safe hands and sufficiently competent to manage firms 
better than their younger counterparts (Evans 2005)1. 
Empirical studies find that CEO age has a significant 
positive association with abnormal returns (Ewart 2014) 
and a significant negative relation with the volatility of 
stock return (Serfling 2013). 
 Due to inconclusive extant literature that primarily 
focuses on developed countries, this paper further 
investigates the relationship between CEO age and firm 
performance in the context of the developing country of 
Malaysia. The study establishes the following hypothesis 
for investigation: 
 
H1: CEO age has a negative association with firm 
performance.
CEO GENDER AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Despite equal legal and moral status, men and women 
are two extremes of the same continuum. Men and 
women differ from each other in their thoughts, struggles, 
commitments and handlings of risk and stress, among 
others (Butt et al. 2012). Such gender-based differences 
obviously affect the success of individuals at work (Peni 
2012) which complicates the relationship between CEO 
gender and firm performance (Khan & Vieito 2013; 
Strelcova 2004). The complication of the relationship is 
further evident as some researchers favour men (Betz, 
O’Connell & Shepard 1989; Powell & Ansic 1997), while 
others support women at the top of organisations (Khan & 
Vieito 2013; Schubert 2006).
 Proponents argue that a woman becoming CEO in a 
male dominated corporate arena signifies the endorsement 
of her extraordinary talents and superior skills, which 
improve firm performance (Khan & Vieito 2013; Strelcova 
2004). Additionally, proponents also argue that since 
women are more conservative and risk averse, firms 
with female CEOs face fewer risks. The conservatism of 
female CEOs not only avoids losses, but also improves the 
performance of the firms (Khan & Vieito 2013; Schubert 
2006). 
 Moreover, the co-operative style of female executives 
is more productive than the competitive style of their 
male counterparts (Adams et al. 2007; Eagly & Carli 
2003). Accordingly, the former has become a widespread 
phenomenon that attracted considerable public attention in 
recent years (Strelcova 2004). By supporting demographic 
heterogeneity at the top of the organisation, upper echelon 
theory also supports female CEOs (Hambrick & Mason 
1984). 
 Empirically, many studies find that female CEOs have 
a significant positive association with ROA (Khan & Vieito 
2013; Peni 2012), market value and the overall success of 
firms (Peni 2012). Despite only attaining 5% representation 
in Fortune 1,000, female CEOs account for 7% of the total 
revenue of Fortune 1,000 firms in 2013. Also, female CEOs 
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accounted for an average return of 103.4%, which was 
higher than the 69.5% average of Fortune 1,0002.
  In contrast, opponents argue that female CEOs are 
good in helping people, but not in improving governance 
or cash management of the firms (Betz et al. 1989; Powell 
& Ansic 1997). Therefore, female CEOs invest only one-
third of the available economic resources of the firms. 
Also, female CEOs lack industry-specific knowledge, which 
leads to firm investments in less profitable or vulnerable 
projects (Loscocco, Robinson, Hall & Allen 1991; Navarro 
& Gallo 2014). Moreover, it is also argued that the higher 
compensation of male CEOs indicates their worth and 
superiority over their female counterparts (Adams et al. 
2007). Many studies find that female CEOs have a significant 
negative association with firm performance (Loscocco et al. 
1991; Navarro & Gallo 2014). Additionally, it is found that 
investors negatively react to the appointment of a female 
CEO (Lee & James 2007). 
 Due to incongruent extant literature that primarily 
concentrates on developed countries, this paper investigates 
the relationship between CEO gender and firm performance 
in the context of the developing country of Malaysia. 
The study establishes the following hypothesis for 
investigation on the basis that upper echelon theory 
supports heterogeneity at the top of the organisation: 
H2: CEO gender (female) has a positive association with 
firm performance.
CEO ETHNICITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Minorities account for one-third of U.S. society and are 
expected to become a majority by 2050 (U.S Census 
Bureau 2011). However, corporate America does not reflect 
their substantial presence in the society. The disparity 
becomes more visible at the top where less than 4% of the 
CEOs are ethnic minorities in the Fortune 500 (Diversity 
Inc. 2011). 
 However, such a scenario differs significantly from the 
multi-ethnic society of Malaysia, which hosts three major 
ethnicities (i.e., Malay, Chinese and Indians, among others). 
In the case of Malaysia, CEOs in public firms are typically 
ethnic Malays, while the CEOs of private corporations are 
typically ethnic Chinese. Besides playing a substantial role 
in the legal and medical professions in Malaysia, ethnic 
Indians have no noticeable representation at the top of 
Malaysian corporations. Based on cultural characteristics, 
ethnic Malays are characterised by low individualism, high 
uncertainty avoidance and transparency, among others. 
Ethnic Chinese, on the other hand, are individualistic and 
willing to take risks by accepting new challenges (Amran et 
al. 2014; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Hofstede 1991; Nguyen, 
Hagendorff & Eshraghi 2015).
 The cultural background of a CEO has an obvious 
impact on firm performance. The impact of the cultural 
background of the CEO on firm performance can easily 
be seen in the differences in compensation of CEOs 
representing different cultures of the world (Adams 
et al. 2007; Jalbert et al. 2007). Upper echelon theory 
postulates that heterogeneity at the top augments the 
quality of strategic decisions. The cultural background 
of a CEO not only affects a firm’s internal environment, 
but also influences a firm’s response to exogenous shocks 
(Hambrick & Mason 1984; Nguyen et al. 2015). The 
ethnicity of a CEO contributes unique insights by providing 
varied perspectives that facilitate complex decision-making 
by firms (Nguyen et al. 2015). 
  It is argued that an individual representative of an 
ethnic minority becoming a CEO serves as evidence of the 
extraordinary talents and skills of the individual, which 
improves firm performance (Adams et al. 2007; Jalbert 
et al. 2007; Nguyen et al. 2015). Amran et al. (2014) find 
that ethnic Malay CEOs have a significant positive relation 
with the performance of the government-linked companies 
in Malaysia. Hwang and Kim (2009) offered a unique 
explanation that CEO ethnicity augments monitoring due 
to his/her low social ties with individuals from other races 
or ethnicities in the organisation. 
 On the contrary, it is also argued that the cultural 
background of a CEO has no relation with firm performance. 
A study comparing minority and non-minority led 
companies among Fortune 500 companies finds no 
significant difference in their performance (Mycroft 
2012). More specifically, the findings of the study indicate 
that ethnic minority CEOs neither improve nor diminish 
firm performance measured by return on assets; return 
on equity; and earnings per share. The results may lack 
uniformity due to differences in the samples or contexts 
of such studies. 
 To sum up, despite a vital role in strategic management, 
extant empirical studies pay less attention to the 
relationship between the race or ethnicity of a CEO and 
firm performance. Moreover, the findings of such scarce 
literature also lack uniformity. The present paper further 
investigates the association of CEO ethnicity with firm 
performance. On the basis of accepting new challenges, 
willingness for taking risks and upper echelon theory, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
H3: CEO ethnicity (Chinese) has a positive association with 
firm performance.
CEO NATIONALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
The international experience of a CEO assists firms in 
creating global competitiveness through international 
diversification. Such experience grooms executives for 
coping with unexpected issues and new challenges. Also, 
such experience equips executives with skills that cannot be 
acquired indigenously. Therefore, international experience 
has become a pre-requisite for the post of a CEO (Bass 1985; 
Black, Gregersen, Mendenhall & Stroh 1999; Carpenter et 
al. 2000; Daily et al. 2000). 
  Accordingly, firms consistently demand and reward 
CEOs with international experience, particularly in today’s 
age of globalisation (Sanda, Garba & Mikailu 2008; Wah 
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2015). In this regard, firms simply strive to attract foreign 
executives that could contribute managerial talents and 
technical skills (Sanda, Garba & Mikailu 2008). Upper 
echelon theory also encourages the presence of foreign 
CEOs to improve the operational efficiency and monitoring 
capabilities of an organisation (Hambrick & Mason 1984). 
Accordingly, the number of foreign CEOs has doubled in the 
USA during the last decade (Black et al. 1999; Carpenter et 
al. 2000). The statistics evidence that approximately 40% 
of S & P 500 CEOs had international experience (Spencer 
Stuart 2006). The international experience (Daily et al. 
2000) or foreign nationality of the CEO is found to have 
a significant positive relation with profitability (Sanda 
et al. 2008) and financial performance of the firms (Wah 
2015). Also, a study finds that CEOs from Central and South 
America, Australia and New Zealand earn a higher return 
on assets than others (Jalbert et al. 2007). 
 However, in contrast, it is also argued that foreign 
executives have low attendance and, thus, play a weak 
monitoring role due to their residence abroad. Moreover, 
language barriers and unfamiliarity with or superficial 
knowledge of the local culture, market and economy 
also reduce their efficiency (Arioglu & Borak 2015). 
Accordingly, foreign CEOs are found to have no significant 
impact on the stock market (Arioglu & Borak 2015) and 
firm market value (Vania & Supatmi 2014) in emerging 
economies, such as Turkey and Indonesia.
 Because of the incongruent and scarce literature 
that primarily focuses on developed countries, this 
paper further investigates the relationship between CEO 
nationality and firm performance in the developing country 
of Malaysia. For further investigation, the study establishes 
the following hypothesis on the basis of upper echelon 
theory, which favours the foreign nationality of a CEO: 
H
4
: CEO nationality (foreign) has a positive association 
with firm performance.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The population of the present study is composed of 
960 companies listed into 12 different sectors on Bursa 
Malaysia as of 31 December 2009 (Economic Planning 
Unit 2011). However, the paper did not include finance, 
hotels and mining sectors the sample. The finance sector 
is excluded due to its unique structure, while the hotel and 
mining sectors are not considered due to the small number 
of companies. By virtue of the previously identified stratum 
(sectors), the paper employs stratified random sampling. 
The sampling method is selected because it truly represents 
the population by providing a fair chance of selection to 
every unit (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009). The Rao-
soft size calculator determined the minimum sample size 
of 271 companies. However, following previous literature, 
the present study selects a sample of 320 listed companies, 
which is larger than the minimum required as reported in 
Table 1 (Greene 2012; Gujarati 1995).
 Following previous literature in the area, data 
concerning the age, gender, ethnicity and nationality of 
CEOs are collected from the annual reports of the sample 
companies from 2010 to 2014 (Amran et al. 2014; Butt 
et al. 2012; Wah 2015). Data concerning the age and 
nationality of CEOs are easily collected since they are 
clearly stated in the annual reports (Amran et al. 2014). 
However, following Darmadi (2013), data concerning 
the gender and ethnicity of CEOs is determined through 
the visible difference in names and physical appearance 
(photos) provided in annual reports. Data for control 
variables (i.e., age; size; leverage of the firms; government 
credit to the private sector; and proxies of ROE and market 
value) are extracted from Thomson Reuters DataStream in 
a fashion similar to Amran et al. (2014). Due to the repeated 
nature of observations over time, the paper employs a 
panel approach for overcoming the specific issues of pure 
cross-sectional or time series data (Greene 2012; Gujarati 
1995).
CONTROL VARIABLES
Based on the significant positive and negative association 
of the age (Pástor & Veronesi 2003; Sulong & Nor 2010), 
size (Cheung, Thomas, Limpaphayom & Zhou 2007; 
Durnev & Kim 2005) and leverage of a firm (Hatfield, 
Cheng & Davidson III 1994; Mule & Mukras 2015), the 
present study controls for their effects. Also, the study 
controls for the possible positive (Nicolò, Laeven & Ueda 
2008) or negative (Fafchamps & Schundeln 2011; Zhang & 
Rajagopalan 2009) effects of government credit to private 
sector. Following Peni (2012), the effects for industry and 
time are also controlled for by including dummy variables 
for nine sectors (Table 1) and a study period of five years 
(2010-2014), respectively.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
The following equations are the two econometric models 
employed in the present study. Table 2 explains the 
operationalisation of all the variables used in the study.
 FP (ROE) 
𝑖𝑡
 = β0 + β1CAGE𝑖𝑡 + β2CGEN𝑖𝑡 + β3CETH𝑖𝑡 
+ β4CNAT𝑖𝑡 + β5FAGE𝑖𝑡 + β6FSIZ𝑖𝑡 + 
β7FLEVG𝑖𝑡 + β8CREDITt𝑖𝑡 + β9ID𝑖𝑡 + 
β10TD𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡
   ……………………………… Model 1 
 FP (MV) 
𝑖𝑡
 = β0 + β1CAGE𝑖𝑡 + β2CGEN𝑖𝑡 + β3CETH𝑖𝑡 
+ β4CNAT𝑖𝑡 + β5FAGE𝑖𝑡 + β6FSIZ𝑖𝑡 + 
β7FLEVG𝑖𝑡 + β8CREDIT𝑖𝑡 + β9ID𝑖𝑡 + 
β10TD𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡
   ………………………………Model 2 
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Where
 FP 𝑖𝑡 = Financial performance measured by ROE and 
market value of the ith firm at time t
	 β  = Beta
CAGE
𝑖𝑡
 = CEO age of the ith firm at time t
CGEN
𝑖𝑡
 = CEO gender of the ith firm at time t
CETH
𝑖𝑡
 = CEO ethnicity of the ith firm at time t
CNAT
𝑖𝑡
 = CEO nationality of the ith firm at time t
FAGE
𝑖𝑡
 = Age of the ith firm at time t
FSIZ
𝑖𝑡 = Size of the ith firm at time t
FLEVG
𝑖𝑡
 = Leverage of the ith firm at time t
CREDIT
𝑖𝑡
 = The effect of credit given by the government 
to private sector on ith firm at time t
 ID = Dummy variables for controlling sector-wise 
effect of the nine sectors on ith firm at time t
 TD
𝑖𝑡
  = Dummy variables for controlling time effect 
of five years of the study on ith firm at time t
 ε
𝑖𝑡
 = Error term of the ith firm at time t
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics which explain the 
mean, minimum and maximum limits for all the variables 
of continuous nature. 
 Additionally, Table 3 provides information concerning 
the frequency distribution of the dichotomous or dummy 
variables applied in the study.
 Table 3 shows that the ROE and log of firm market 
value (MV) have an average of 0.07 and 2.35, respectively. 
The statistics show that Malaysian CEOs have an average 
age of 56.26 years. Also, the findings evidence that female 
CEOs (CGEN) lead only 15 of the sample firms. Moreover, 
the statistics indicate that 66.13% of the sample firms 
have ethnic Chinese CEOs (CETH). In the remaining firms, 
11.44% are foreigners (CNAT) and 22.43% are ethnic 
Malay. The control variables of firm age (FAGE) and firm 
size (FSIZ) have an average of 15.99 and 5.59, respectively. 
Similarly, firm leverage (FLEVG) and government credit to 
private sector (CREDIT) show an average of 46.26% and 
2.06, respectively. 
 Due to the mixed nature of the variables (i.e., 
continuous and dichotomous), this study employs both 
the Pearson and the Spearman correlation matrixes 
below and above the diagonal line as reported in Table 
4. The findings evidence a weak correlation among all 
variables. The statistics of both the correlation matrixes 
show that none of the physical characteristics of a CEO 
has a significant positive association with ROE, with the 
exception of nationality (CNAT). Consistent with Wah 
(2015) the findings indicate that foreign CEOs have good 
vision and understanding of strategic management that 
increases return on shareholders’ equity in Malaysia. 
Among the control variables, firm age (FAGE) is found to 
be insignificant, while firm size (FSIZ) has a significant 
TABLE 1. Population and sample
S.No Sectors No. of Comps % Sample %
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Consumer Products
Industrial Products
Construction
Trading Service
Finance
Infrastructure
Hotels
Properties
Plantation
Mining
Technology
Real Estate
187
210
65
234
39
8
4
110
43
1
42
17
19.4
21.9
6.79
24.5
4.08
0.84
0.42
11.5
4.49
0.1
4.28
1.67
61
67
23
74
Exc.
03
Exc.
35
14
Exc.
13
05
20.33
22.33
7.66
24.66
Exc.
1.00
Exc.
11.66
4.66
Exc.
4.33
1.66
Total 960 100 320 100
TABLE 2. Operationalisation/measurement of variables
S.No Variables Measurement References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
7.
8
9.
8.
9. 
CEO Age
CEO Gender
CEO Ethnicity
CEO Nationality
Firm Age
Firm Size
Firm Leverage
Govt. Credit to Private Sector
ROE 
Firm Market Value
Age of CEO 
1 if CEO is male and 0 if otherwise
1 if CEO is ethnic Chinese and 0 if otherwise 
1 if CEO is a foreigner and 0 if otherwise 
Number of years since the firm is listed 
Log of total assets
Total assets/Total equity
Log of Government credit to private sector
Net Income/shareholders’ equity
Outstanding shares multiplied by market price
(Amran et al. 2014)
(Amran et al. 2014)
(Amran et al. 2014)
(Wah 2015)
(Amran et al.  2014)
(Wahab, How & Verhoeven 2007)
(Wahab et al. 2007)
(Fafchamps & Schundeln 2011)
(Darmadi 2013)
(Butt et al. 2012)
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positive association with ROE. Firm leverage (FLEVG) 
and government credit to private sector (CREDIT) have 
significant negative relations with ROE.
 Table 4 also reports the correlation of CEO physical 
characteristics with firm market value (MV). The findings 
of both the correlation matrixes show that the age (CAGE) 
and ethnicity (CETH) of a CEO have significant positive 
correlations with firm market value (MV). The findings 
indicate that shareholders express more confidence in 
senior CEOs. Consistent with Serfling (2013), senior CEOs 
reduce risks by avoiding investment in vulnerable projects. 
Accordingly, stock markets assign a higher value to firms 
with senior CEOs.
 The statistics reported in Table 4 also show that the 
market expresses confidence in firms with ethnic Chinese 
CEOs. The findings are interesting as shareholders place 
value on senior CEOs who are considered safe hands, 
but also express confidence in ethnic Chinese CEOs that 
take risks by accepting new challenges. As a plausible 
explanation, the findings imply that ethnic Chinese firms 
are old and, thus, benefit from their previously established 
business networks and contacts in the domestic and 
international market (Yeung 1999). The findings are 
consistent with Jalbert et al. (2007), who find that CEO 
ethnicity has a significant positive role in improving firm 
performance. 
 The insignificant positive association of the gender 
(CGEN) and nationality (CNAT) of a CEO with firm market 
value implies that investors have no significant trust in 
women and foreign CEOs in the Malaysian context. The 
findings concerning the gender of a CEO are consistent with 
Adams et al. (2007). Similarly, the findings concerning 
the nationality of a CEO support the results of Arioglu 
and Borak (2015) and Vania and Supatmi (2014) who 
find that foreign CEOs have no significant relation to firm 
market value in emerging economies, such as Turkey and 
Indonesia.
  Among the control variables, firm age (FAGE) and 
leverage (FLEVG) have no significant effect, while firm size 
(FSIZ) and government credit to private sector (CREDIT) 
have significant positive associations with firm market 
value. The findings indicate that investors do not place 
any value to the age and leverage of the firms. However, 
investors place importance on large firms and the provision 
of government credit or funds to the private sector. 
 Before employing the regression estimation, the 
study investigates issues associated with multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and cross-sectional 
independence. In regards to multicollinearity, the statistics 
of both the correlational matrices (i.e. Pearson and 
Spearman) show no correlation between independent 
variables that are equal or higher than 0.80 as reported in 
Table 4. Thus, no issues relating to multicollinearity are 
indicated to be present in any model of the study. In regards 
to heteroscedasticity, the results of the Breusch-Pagan/
Cook-Weisberg Test (i.e., chi2 (1) = 11.36 and Prob. > chi2 
= 0.0008) for ROE (Model 1) and (chi2 (1) = 21.05 and Prob. 
> chi2 = 0.000) for MV (Model 2) confirm the existence of 
heteroscedasticity in both models of the study. Similarly the 
results of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation shows F 
(1, 221) = 5.889, Prob. > F = 0.0160 in Model 1 (ROE) and 
F (1, 319) = 356.432, Prob. > F = 0.0000 in Model 2 (MV). 
The statistics confirm serial correlation in both models of 
the study (Greene, 2012; Gujarati, 1995). The results of 
the Pesaran test (-0.040, Pr. = 1.0321) for ROE (Model 1) 
and (5.986, Pr. = 0.0000) for MV (Model 2) only indicate 
cross-sectional dependence in Model 2 of the study. In 
light of the findings, the study employs a Pooled OLS with 
robust standard errors for estimating both models (Model 
1 and Model 2) of the study as recommended by Hoechle 
(2007).    
 Table 5 shows the regression results for the relationships 
between the physical characteristics of the CEO and firm 
performance measured by ROE and market value. The 
TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Min. Max Std. 
Deviation
Frequency Valid/Cum.
Percent
MV
ROE
CAGE
CGEN 
Male
CETH 
Others 
CNAT 
Others 
FAGE
FSIZ
FLEVG
CREDIT
1600
1600
1600
1600
-
1600
-
1600
-
1600
1600
1600
1600
2.35
0.07
56.26
-
-
-
-
-
-
15.99
5.59
46.26
2.06
0.89
-1.85
50.00
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.00
4.07
-376.63
2.03
4.73
3.70
89.00
-
-
-
-
-
-
42.00
7.36
546.49
2.08
0.71
0.22
8.26
-
-
-
-
-
-
7.25
0.59
68.75
0.02
-
-
-
15
1585
1058
542
183
1417
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.9
99.1
66.13
33.9
11.4
88.6
-
-
-
-
MV = Firm market value, ROE = Return on Equity, CAGE = CEO age, CGEN = CEO gender (Female), CETH = CEO ethnicity (Chinese), 
CNAT = CEO nationality (Foreign), FAGE = Firm age, FSIZ = Firm size, FLEVG = Firm leverage, CREDIT = Government credit to 
private sector.
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findings show that CEO age (CAGE) has an insignificant 
negative and positive relation with firm performance 
measured by ROE and market value, respectively. The 
results indicate that an increase in the age of a CEO has no 
significant negative or positive impact on firm accounting 
and market-based performance. The finding may be due to 
the weak physical stamina of senior CEOs that are unable 
to ensure the efficient utilisation of a firm’s resources 
(Cline & Yore 2016; Jalbert et al. 2002). The findings 
are consistent with those of Soriano & Castrogiovanni, 
(2012), but inconsistent with Amran et al. (2014) who 
find a significant negative relation between CEO age and 
the performance of the government-linked companies in 
Malaysia. The inconsistency may be due to the differences 
in sample or timing of the study. Overall, the findings reject 
H1 for both Model 1 (ROE) and Model 2 (firm market value) 
of the study.
 Table 5 shows that female CEOs (CGEN) have an 
insignificant negative association with ROE. Consistent with 
previous literature, the finding has a plausible explanation 
that, being highly risk averse, female CEOs undercapitalise 
firms’ economic resources, which negatively affects return 
on equity. Moreover, being less experienced, female CEOs 
primarily invest in highly risky or vulnerable projects 
that do not increase return on equity (Loscocco et al. 
1991; Navarro & Gallo 2014). The findings are consistent 
with Martin, Nishikawa and Williams (2009), but are 
inconsistent with Khan and Vieito (2013) in the context 
of the USA. The inconsistency may be due to the different 
context of the studies, among other distinctions.
 In contrast, a female CEO (CGEN) has a significant 
positive association with firm market value. Consistent 
with extant literature, since female CEOs are typically 
more conservative and highly risk averse; therefore, firms 
led by female CEOs face fewer risks and losses. Therefore, 
markets and shareholders express high trust and confidence 
in female CEOs. The findings are also logical as female 
CEOs in the male dominated corporate arena reflect their 
extraordinary talent, which improves firm performance 
(Adams et al. 2007; Eagly & Carli 2003; Khan & Vieito 
2013; Schubert 2006). The findings are consistent with 
Peni (2012), but inconsistent with Lee and James (2007). 
The inconsistency may be a result of differences in context, 
sample or methodology of the studies. Overall, the findings 
partially support H2 of the study by showing an insignificant 
negative relation with ROE (Model 1) and a significant 
positive relation with firm market value (Model 2). 
 Table 5 reports that CEO ethnicity (CETH) has a weak 
significant and positive relation with both ROE and firm 
market value. The findings can be explained by the fact 
that most of the ethnic Chinese-owned firms are relatively 
old and have more experienced CEOs than ethnic Malay 
owned firms, which possibly improves the performance 
of the sample of Malaysian firms in the present study. 
Consistent with Yeung (1999), the findings can also be 
attributed to the fact that ethnic Chinese CEOs follow 
Western management practices and establish effective 
personal and business contacts with ethnic Chinese 
within and outside their country of origin. Such practices, 
in turn, facilitate firms to develop a competitive edge, 
which improves their performance. The findings are also 
supported by extant literature indicating that ethnic Chinese 
CEOs typically characterised as engaging in risk taking and 
accepting new challenges (Amran et al. 2014; Haniffa & 
Cooke 2002). However, the findings are contradictory with 
Amran et al. (2014), which may be due to their sample of 
government-linked companies, which are principally led 
by ethnic Malay CEOs. Overall, the findings fully support 
H3 for both models of the study.
 Table 5 also shows that foreign CEOs (CNAT) have a 
significant positive association with ROE and firm market 
value. According to previous literature, the findings may 
be explained by the fact that the international experience of 
a CEO contributes to managerial skills and other technical 
talents which, in turn, ensure the efficient and professional 
conduct of the firms (Sanda, Garba & Mikailu 2008), which 
improves their accounting and market-based performance 
(Black et al. 1999; Carpenter et al. 2000; Daily et al. 2000).
The findings fully support H
4
 for both models of the study 
and are also consistent with Wah (2015) in the Malaysian 
context. However, the findings are inconsistent with 
Arioglu and Borak (2015) and Vania and Supatmi (2014). 
The inconsistency may be due to contextual differences 
as the studies are conducted in Turkey and Indonesia, 
respectively. 
 The findings for the control variables reported in Table 
5 show that firm age (FAGE) has a significant negative 
relation with ROE and firm market value. The findings 
indicate that Malaysian firms cannot adapt to emerging 
challenges and new developments around the world. 
Subsequently, most Malaysian firms lost their substantial 
share in the market by obtaining close substitutes for their 
products. The findings are consistent with Pástor and 
Veronesi (2003) who find that firm performance declines 
with an increase in age. 
 The control variable of firm size shows a significant 
positive association with ROE and firm market value. The 
findings indicate that the large size of a firm not only 
improves return on equity, but also increases its market 
value. Size is important because large firms are in better 
position to improve their performance by ensuring efficient 
utilisation of their substantial assets (Cheung et al. 2007). 
Therefore, investors prefer large firms that increase their 
market value (Durnev & Kim 2005). 
 The findings reported in Table 5 show that firm 
leverage has a significant negative relation with ROE. 
Extant literature explains that an increase in leverage 
increases interest expense, which leads to a decline of 
firm’s profitability (Mule & Mukras 2015). However, 
the relationship between leverage and firm market value 
is insignificant negative. The findings endorse Hatfield, 
Cheng & Davidson III, (1994) who find that investors 
believe in a firm’s ability to know the level or limit of 
leverage that suits them. 
 The provision of government credit to the private 
sector (CREDIT) has an insignificant negative relation with 
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ROE. According to Fafchamps and Schundeln (2011), the 
findings are logical since an increase in debt increases 
transactional costs and debt servicing, which decrease 
shareholder return. Thus, an insignificant negative 
relationship exists between government credit to private 
sector and ROE. The relationship of government credit is 
also insignificant, but positive, with firm market value. 
Overall, the provision of government credit to the private 
sector has no significant negative or positive association 
with the accounting or market-based performance of firms. 
The findings are inconsistent with Nicolò et al., (2008) 
which may be due to differences in the allocated amount, 
accessing procedure or context of these studies. 
 To sum up, the predictors representing CEO physical 
characteristics caused a total change of 14.53% (R-Squared, 
0.1453) in the ROE (Model 1). The F-value is 87.52 with a 
probability of 0.0003 for the model. Similarly, CEO physical 
characteristics affected 10.06% (R-Squared, 0.1006) of the 
market value of the sample firms (Model 2). The model 
has an F-value of 37.12 with a probability of 0.0001.The 
overall findings suggest that the physical characteristics 
of a CEO have a significant role in association with both 
the accounting and the market-based performance of non-
financial listed companies in Malaysia.
RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Based on the insignificant positive relation of CEO age with 
ROE and firm market value (Table 5), this paper recommends 
that Malaysian firms consider the appointment of younger 
CEOs in the future. The recommendation is consistent with 
practices among US corporations that hire young CEOs 
despite the remarkable and successful corporate stories of 
Steve Jobs (Apple Inc.) and Bill Gates (IBM, Corporation) 
in the recent years. Also, the recommendation is compatible 
with statistics showing that most promising CEOs are below 
35 years of age in the USA today3.
 The statistics evidence a low representation of women 
at the top of the organisation. In Thailand, forty-nine 
percent of CEOs are female, which is the highest in the 
world4. After considering the insignificant negative and 
significant positive association with ROE and firm market 
value, respectively (Table 5), this paper recommends that 
Malaysian firms should also consider the appointment of 
competent and qualified female CEOs in the future.
 Based on the significant positive association of 
ethnic Chinese and foreign CEOs with ROE and market 
value respectively (Table 5), the paper supports their 
presence at the top of non-financial Malaysian listed 
companies. Based on the significant positive association 
with firm performance (accounting and market) and the 
low representation of foreign CEOs in Malaysia (i.e., 
11.4%), this study also recommends a further increase 
in the number of foreign CEOs in Malaysia. Moreover, 
on the basis of findings regarding foreign CEOs, this 
paper recommends that Malaysian firms should provide 
opportunities for ethnic Malay CEOs by assigning them 
international tasks and assignments. 
 Overall, this study contributes to the existing limited 
and inconclusive literature, particularly in the context of 
developing countries such as Malaysia. Also, the findings 
of the study provide important insights for regulators and 
policy makers to update corporate strategies in the country 
in the future. Moreover, the findings can be applied by 
shareholders, creditors, insurance companies, banks and 
financial institutions in relation to the evaluation of firms 
by considering the physical characteristics of a CEO. 
 Future studies should consider other characteristics 
of CEOs, such as professional education; relevant industry 
TABLE 5. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors
Models ROE – Model 1 MV – Model 2
Variables Coefficients Drisc/Kraay  t  P Coefficients Disc/Kraay  t  P
CAGE
CGEN
CETH
CNAT
FAGE
FSIZ
FLEVG
CREDIT
Constant
-0.00032
-0.02340
 0.01405
 0.02765
-0.00298
 0.12254
-0.00027
-0.04291
 0.44360
0 .00031
0.01183
0.00569
0. 00700
0.000745
0.01106
0.00008
0.04302
0.13080
-1.06
-1.98
 2.47
 3.95
-4.00
11.08
-3.45
-1.89
3.39
0.351
0.119
0.069
0.017
0.016
0.000
0.026
0.131
0.001
0.00172
0.36840
0.09269
0.17279
-0.00488
0.31928
-0.00016
0.25301
 0.06370
0.00182
0.10308
0.04292
0.07128
0.00185
0.01658
0.00015
0.12085
0.02260
0.94
3.57
2.16
2.42
-2.63
19.25
-1.08
 2.09
 2.82
0.400
0.023
0.097
0.072
0.058
0.000
0.341
0.104
0.005
Year Dummies (YD) 
Industry Dummies (ID) 
Observations
R-squared
F-value
Prob.
Included
Included
1600
0.1453
87.52
0.0003
Included
Included
1600
0.1006
37.12
0.0001
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significant at the 1 %level: sample = 320, T= 5, N (320*5) 
= 1600. MV= Firm market value, ROE= Return on Equity, CAGE= CEO age, CGEN = CEO gender (Female), CETH= CEO ethnicity (Chinese), CNAT= CEO 
nationality (Foreign), FAGE= Firm age, FSIZ=Firm size, FLEVG = Firm leverage, CREDIT= Government credit to private sector.
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experience; quality of decisions; leadership style; and 
personality traits. Besides extending the period of the 
study and the domain of firm performance, studies in the 
future may also consider the response of Malaysian CEOs 
through questionnaires or interviews for further accuracy 
and generalisation of the derived conclusions of this study. 
NOTES
1. Evans, Mark, 2005, Abolish mandatory retirement, 
90% say, Financial Post, October 24.
2. Fortune: Female-led businesses beat the stock market, 
but their numbers remain low by Andrea Newell on 
Wednesday, Jul 16th, 2014 available at http://www.
triplepundit.com/2014/07/female-ceo-led-businesses-
consistently-post-solid-financial-returns/#
3. The Richest available at http://www.therichest.com/
rich-list/most-influential/10-of-the-youngest-ceos-
today/
4. Thailand has highest number of female CEOs globally 
available at http://investvine.com/thailanmd-has-
most-female-ceos/
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